Cryptography & PKI

CISSP CISSP · Security Architecture and Engineering

By Abu Anns · Last updated 20 November 2026Exam version: April 2024 outline (current until 15 April 2027)

What cryptography provides

Cryptography is the mathematics of protecting information, and Domain 3 tests it more deeply than any other technical topic on the CISSP. The services cryptography provides map directly to the security properties you already know: confidentiality (encryption hides content from unauthorised readers), integrity (hashing and message authentication detect modification), authentication (proving who sent a message), and non-repudiation (proving the sender cannot later deny sending it). The exam's central theme is choosing the right tool: encryption gives confidentiality but not integrity; hashing gives integrity but not confidentiality; digital signatures give authentication, integrity and non-repudiation but not confidentiality. Questions that ask for the best control for a requirement expect you to match the service to the need.

Symmetric cryptography: one shared key

In symmetric cryptography, the same key encrypts and decrypts. It is fast and efficient, which is why it protects bulk data — but both parties must share the key securely in advance, which is the key distribution problem. The standard symmetric algorithm is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), a block cipher with key sizes of 128, 192 or 256 bits and a 128-bit block size; AES-256 is the usual choice for sensitive data. Older algorithms appear on the exam mainly as things to avoid: DES (56-bit key, broken by brute force), 3DES (DES applied three times, deprecated and slow), and RC4 (a stream cipher with known vulnerabilities, no longer acceptable). Block ciphers encrypt fixed-size blocks of data and need a mode of operation — ECB (each block encrypted independently, which leaks patterns and should be avoided), CBC (each block chained to the previous one, requiring an initialisation vector), CTR (turns a block cipher into a stream cipher, parallelisable), and GCM (an authenticated encryption mode that provides both confidentiality and integrity, and the modern default). Stream ciphers encrypt data bit by bit and suit real-time communication. The exam also tests key length as a security factor: symmetric keys are short (128–256 bits) because brute-forcing a 128-bit key is computationally infeasible.

Asymmetric cryptography: key pairs

In asymmetric cryptography, each party has a key pair: a public key shared freely and a private key kept secret. Data encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the private key (giving confidentiality), and data encrypted with the private key can be verified with the public key (giving authentication and non-repudiation). Asymmetric cryptography is much slower than symmetric, so in practice it is used to exchange symmetric keys and to sign data, not to encrypt bulk data. The main algorithms are RSA (based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers; 2048-bit keys are the current minimum, 3072-bit recommended for long-term protection), Diffie-Hellman (for securely agreeing on a shared secret over an insecure channel — it provides key exchange, not encryption or authentication by itself), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) (equivalent security to RSA with much shorter keys — a 256-bit ECC key is roughly equivalent to a 3072-bit RSA key, making it ideal for constrained devices), and ElGamal and DSA (primarily for digital signatures). The exam's key facts: asymmetric keys must be much longer than symmetric keys for equivalent security; asymmetric encryption is roughly 1,000 times slower than symmetric; and Diffie-Hellman alone is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks because it does not authenticate the parties.

AlgorithmTypeKey sizePrimary use
AESSymmetric block cipher128 / 192 / 256 bitsBulk encryption
RSAAsymmetric2048+ bitsEncryption, digital signatures, key exchange
ECCAsymmetric256+ bitsSame as RSA with shorter keys; mobile and IoT
Diffie-HellmanAsymmetric (key agreement)2048+ bitsAgreeing a shared secret
SHA-256Hash256-bit digestIntegrity verification
DES / 3DES / RC4Symmetric (legacy)56 / 168 / variableDeprecated — do not use

Hashing and message authentication

A hash function takes input of any size and produces a fixed-size output (a digest or hash value). A good cryptographic hash is one-way (you cannot recover the input from the output), deterministic (the same input always gives the same output), and collision-resistant (it is infeasible to find two different inputs with the same output). Hashes provide integrity: if the data changes, the hash changes. The standard is the SHA-2 family (SHA-256 and SHA-512); SHA-3 is the newer standard. MD5 and SHA-1 are broken for collision resistance and must not be used for security purposes. A plain hash does not authenticate the sender — anyone can compute the hash of modified data — so for authentication you need an HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code), which combines the hash with a shared secret key. An HMAC provides both integrity and authentication, but not non-repudiation, because either party holding the shared key could have produced it.

Digital signatures and non-repudiation

A digital signature is created by hashing a message and then encrypting the hash with the sender's private key. Anyone can verify it with the sender's public key: if the decrypted hash matches a freshly computed hash of the message, the message is unaltered and it came from the holder of the private key. Digital signatures provide authentication, integrity and non-repudiation — the three services that make them the answer whenever a question asks how to prove a sender cannot deny sending a message. Note the contrast with encryption for confidentiality (encrypt with the recipient's public key) and with HMAC (which provides authentication but not non-repudiation, because the shared key means either party could have created it). The exam frequently tests this distinction: if the requirement includes non-repudiation, only a digital signature will do.

PKI: certificates and trust

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) solves the problem of trusting that a public key really belongs to the person or system that claims it. A Certificate Authority (CA) verifies an entity's identity and issues a digital certificate binding that identity to a public key. Certificates follow the X.509 standard and contain the subject's identity, the public key, the issuer, a validity period, and the CA's digital signature. When a certificate is compromised or no longer valid before its expiry, it must be revoked: the CA publishes a Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or clients check status in real time via the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). OCSP is more current than a CRL but requires the responder to be available; OCSP stapling lets the server present a recent OCSP response itself, improving both privacy and reliability. The chain of trust runs from a root CA (self-signed, kept offline and heavily protected) through intermediate CAs to end-entity certificates. If a root CA is compromised, every certificate in the chain is untrustworthy — which is why root keys are protected with hardware security modules and strict ceremony. Registration Authorities (RAs) verify identities on behalf of the CA but do not issue certificates.

Key management lifecycle

Cryptography is only as strong as its key management, and the exam tests the full lifecycle: generation (keys must be generated from a strong random source — weak randomness is a classic failure), distribution (keys must reach their users securely, which is the problem asymmetric cryptography and key exchange protocols solve), storage (keys must be protected, ideally in a hardware security module or a managed key service, never hard-coded in source code), rotation (keys should be changed periodically and immediately after suspected compromise), escrow and recovery (copies held so that data is not lost if a key is lost — essential for encryption keys, but never for signing keys, since a recovered signing key would destroy non-repudiation), and destruction (keys must be securely destroyed when retired). The exam's favourite trap is key escrow for signing keys: escrowing a signing key means someone else can sign in your name, which defeats non-repudiation entirely.

Cryptanalytic attacks

The exam expects you to recognise the main attacks on cryptographic systems. Brute force tries every possible key; its feasibility depends on key length. A dictionary attack tries likely passwords from a list. A rainbow table is a precomputed table of hash values used to reverse password hashes quickly — the countermeasure is salting, adding unique random data to each password before hashing so that precomputed tables are useless. A birthday attack exploits the mathematics of collisions: finding any two inputs with the same hash takes far fewer attempts than finding a specific one (roughly the square root of the hash space), which is why hash outputs must be long. A known-plaintext attack uses pairs of plaintext and ciphertext to derive the key. A chosen-plaintext attack lets the attacker choose plaintexts to be encrypted. A man-in-the-middle attack intercepts and alters communications between two parties — the countermeasure is mutual authentication, which is why unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman is vulnerable. A replay attack reuses a captured valid message; the countermeasures are timestamps and nonces (numbers used once). Side-channel attacks exploit physical leakage such as timing or power consumption rather than the mathematics.

Exam mindset for cryptography

Cryptography questions reward matching the tool to the requirement. Need confidentiality? Encryption. Need integrity? Hashing or HMAC. Need to prove who sent it and prevent denial? Digital signature. Need to exchange a key? Diffie-Hellman or RSA key transport — with authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle. And when a question mentions a specific algorithm, ask whether it is current or deprecated: DES, 3DES, RC4, MD5 and SHA-1 are all answers that mean "do not use this".

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Exam traps to watch for

Practice questions

Test yourself on this guide. Answers are checked instantly, with a full explanation for each question.

Q1.A company needs to ensure that purchase orders sent to suppliers cannot be altered in transit and that the supplier can prove the order came from the company, even if the company later denies sending it. Which mechanism meets ALL of these requirements?

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Q2.Two parties need to agree on a shared symmetric key over an insecure network, but they have no prior shared secret and no PKI. Which protocol is designed for this, and what is its main weakness in this situation?

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Q3.A web application stores user passwords as unsalted MD5 hashes. An attacker who steals the database can quickly recover most passwords using precomputed tables. Which TWO changes BEST fix this vulnerability?

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Q4.A certificate authority’s private key is suspected to have been compromised. What is the MOST critical immediate action?

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Q5.An organisation encrypts its database backups with AES-256. The encryption key is stored in a file on the same backup server, protected only by file permissions. What is the MOST significant weakness in this design?

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Q6.A mobile device manufacturer needs public-key cryptography but has very limited processing power and battery life. Which algorithm is the BEST choice?

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Q7.An attacker captures a valid authentication message and replays it later to gain access. Which countermeasure BEST prevents this attack?

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Q8.A company is designing a system that must detect whether stored records have been altered, but does not need to keep the records confidential. Which is the SIMPLEST appropriate control?

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