Identity and Authentication Design
AZ-305 AZ-305 · Design identity, governance, and monitoring solutions
Identity is the control plane of every Azure solution. When the perimeter was the corporate firewall, identity was one control among many; in the cloud, identity is the perimeter. Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) is the identity provider for Azure, and AZ-305 expects you to design authentication and identity solutions for employees, partners, customers, and workloads — not just to know that Entra ID exists, but to choose between its many options against real requirements.
Authentication methods: design for phishing resistance
The exam rewards passwordless, phishing-resistant authentication. The strongest options are FIDO2 security keys and Windows Hello for Business, both based on public-key cryptography: the private key never leaves the device, and the credential is bound to the legitimate sign-in site, so a phishing page cannot reuse it. Certificate-based authentication (CBA) lets users sign in with an X.509 certificate on a smart card or device — a good fit for organisations that already run a PKI. The Microsoft Authenticator app supports passwordless phone sign-in and, when configured with number matching plus additional context, is a strong phishing-resistant-ish option for the general workforce; number matching defeats "MFA fatigue" attacks, where an attacker spams approval prompts until a tired user taps Approve. Weaker methods — SMS codes and voice calls — are phishable and vulnerable to SIM-swap attacks, so recommend them only as a last resort for users who cannot use anything else. When a scenario mentions executives, administrators, or finance staff, reach for the strongest method available; when it mentions a large frontline workforce with shared devices, think about what is actually deployable at that scale.
Hybrid identity: connecting on-premises AD to Entra ID
Most enterprises still run Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) on-premises, so the exam tests hybrid identity heavily. Microsoft Entra Connect Sync synchronises users, groups, and password hashes from AD DS to Entra ID; Entra Cloud Sync is a lighter agent-based alternative for simpler environments or multiple disconnected forests. The authentication choice is the key design decision. Password hash synchronisation (PHS) is the simplest and most resilient: password hashes sync to Entra ID, authentication happens in the cloud, and sign-in keeps working even if the on-premises link fails. It also enables leaked-credential protection and, combined with pass-through authentication, can serve as a fallback. Pass-through authentication (PTA) validates passwords against on-premises AD DS in real time through lightweight agents — choose it when policy forbids password hashes leaving the premises, but note it depends on the on-premises infrastructure being available. Federation with Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) redirects authentication to on-premises servers entirely; it is the most complex option, requires highly available AD FS infrastructure (including Web Application Proxy servers in the DMZ), and is only justified when a specific requirement — such as smart-card logon with a third-party MFA provider, or sign-in restricted to a corporate network — cannot be met otherwise. For most designs, PHS with seamless single sign-on is the recommended default, with PTA as the middle ground. Seamless SSO gives domain-joined devices automatic sign-in to cloud apps without a password prompt and works with both PHS and PTA.
Conditional Access: policy-based access control
Conditional Access is Entra ID's policy engine: if a sign-in matches certain signals (user, group, device state, location, application, risk level), then enforce controls (require MFA, require a compliant or hybrid-joined device, block access, require a password change, or limit the session). Design points that the exam tests: policies should target groups rather than individual users; every policy needs a tested exclusion for at least one emergency-access ("break-glass") account so a misconfigured policy cannot lock out all administrators; use report-only mode before enforcing a new policy; and combine signals — for example, require MFA for all users, but require a compliant device as well when accessing sensitive apps from outside trusted locations. Conditional Access requires Entra ID P1 or P2 licences (P2 adds Identity Protection risk signals). Remember that Conditional Access evaluates at sign-in and, with Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE), can also revoke sessions in near real time when conditions change.
External identities and workload identities
For partners and suppliers, use Microsoft Entra B2B collaboration: guests sign in with their own identity provider and you manage only their access, not their credentials. For customer-facing applications with millions of consumer users, use Microsoft Entra External ID (the successor to Azure AD B2C), which supports local accounts and social logins with customisable sign-up flows. For applications and services, never use user accounts or long-lived secrets: use managed identities. A system-assigned managed identity is tied to the lifecycle of one Azure resource and is the simplest choice; a user-assigned managed identity is a standalone resource that can be shared across multiple resources and survives the deletion of any one of them. For workloads running outside Azure — GitHub Actions, for example — use workload identity federation, which lets the external platform exchange its own token for an Entra token without storing any Azure secret. When the scenario asks for "no stored credentials", managed identity or workload identity federation is almost always the answer.
Design checklist
When a question describes an identity requirement, work through the layers: who is signing in (employee, guest, customer, workload)? How strong must the authentication be? Where does the authoritative identity live (cloud-only, hybrid, federated)? What signals should gate access, and what happens when the policy misfires? The best answer is usually the simplest design that meets the stated security requirement — passwordless where possible, PHS as the hybrid default, Conditional Access as the enforcement layer, and managed identities everywhere an application touches Azure.
Identity Protection and privileged access
Microsoft Entra ID Protection (a P2 feature) uses machine learning to detect risky sign-ins and compromised accounts, assigning user risk and sign-in risk levels that Conditional Access policies can act on — for example, requiring a password change for a high-risk user or blocking a high-risk sign-in outright. Identity Protection also detects leaked credentials by comparing sign-ins against known breached credential databases. In exam scenarios, "block sign-ins that look compromised" points to Identity Protection risk policies, not to a static Conditional Access rule. For privileged accounts, combine several controls: phishing-resistant authentication, Conditional Access requiring a compliant device, PIM for just-in-time elevation, and dedicated privileged access workstations for the most sensitive roles. Entra ID licensing matters for design: Conditional Access requires P1 or P2, Identity Protection and PIM require P2, and access reviews require P2 or Entra ID Governance licensing. When a scenario specifies a licence tier, check that the recommended feature is included — recommending PIM for a P1-only tenant is a design error.
Exam traps to watch for
- Recommending federation (AD FS) by default for hybrid identity — it is the most complex option and is only justified by a specific requirement PHS or PTA cannot meet.
- Forgetting the break-glass emergency account exclusion in Conditional Access policies — a policy that locks out all admins is a design failure the exam tests.
- Choosing SMS or voice call MFA when the scenario asks for phishing-resistant authentication — only FIDO2, Windows Hello for Business, or certificate-based authentication qualify.
- Using service principals with stored secrets for applications when a managed identity (or workload identity federation outside Azure) removes the secret entirely.
Practice questions
Test yourself on this guide. Answers are checked instantly, with a full explanation for each question.
Q1.A company is moving to Microsoft Entra ID and wants administrators to sign in with the strongest available protection against phishing attacks. Administrators use Windows 11 laptops managed by Intune. Which authentication method should the architect recommend?
Explanation: Windows Hello for Business is phishing-resistant: it uses public-key cryptography with the private key bound to the device, so credentials cannot be phished or replayed on a fake site, and it fits the managed Windows 11 laptops. Option C is wrong because push notifications without number matching are vulnerable to MFA fatigue attacks. Option B is wrong because SMS codes are phishable and exposed to SIM-swap attacks. Option A is wrong because TOTP codes can be phished in real time by an attacker proxying the sign-in.
Exam objective: AZ-305 Domain 1: Design authentication and authorization solutions
Q2.An organisation runs Active Directory Domain Services on-premises and is adopting Microsoft 365. Security policy forbids password hashes from leaving the on-premises network, but users must be able to sign in to cloud applications with their existing credentials. Which hybrid identity authentication method should the architect recommend?
Explanation: Pass-through authentication validates passwords against on-premises AD DS in real time through lightweight agents, so no password hash ever leaves the premises — it directly satisfies the stated policy. Option A is wrong because PHS syncs password hashes to Entra ID, violating the policy. Option C would also keep hashes on-premises, but federation is far more complex (highly available AD FS and proxy infrastructure) and is not justified when PTA meets the requirement. Option B is wrong because cloud-only accounts would not use the existing on-premises credentials at all.
Exam objective: AZ-305 Domain 1: Design authentication and authorization solutions
Q3.A company has deployed Conditional Access policies requiring MFA for all users. After a policy change, administrators discover that no administrator can sign in to the Entra admin centre — every admin sign-in is blocked. What design element was missing?
Explanation: Every Conditional Access design needs at least one emergency-access account excluded from all policies, so administrators can always recover from a misconfiguration. Without it, a bad policy can lock out every admin, exactly as happened here. Option A is wrong because a named location does not help when the policy itself blocks sign-ins. Option C is wrong because adding another restrictive policy would make the lockout worse. Option D is wrong because risk policies are an additional control, not a recovery mechanism.
Exam objective: AZ-305 Domain 1: Design authentication and authorization solutions
Q4.A development team runs an application on Azure App Service that reads secrets from Azure Key Vault and writes to Azure Storage. The security team requires that the application use no stored credentials of any kind. What should the architect recommend?
Explanation: A system-assigned managed identity gives the App Service app an Entra identity with credentials that Azure manages and rotates automatically — no secret is ever stored, satisfying the requirement directly. Option C is wrong because it stores a client secret, which is exactly what the requirement forbids. Option A is wrong because a shared user account is a stored credential and violates least privilege and accountability. Option B is wrong because it still relies on a stored access key and a certificate that must be managed.
Exam objective: AZ-305 Domain 1: Design authentication and authorization solutions
Q5.A company with 20,000 employees is rolling out MFA. Attackers have been bombarding users with MFA approval prompts, hoping someone approves one by mistake. Which configuration change best addresses this specific attack?
Explanation: Number matching requires the user to type the number shown on the sign-in screen into the Authenticator app, so an attacker-initiated prompt cannot be approved by an accidental tap — it directly defeats MFA fatigue attacks. Option C is wrong because it weakens MFA coverage rather than fixing the prompt-spam problem. Option D is wrong because shorter sessions would increase the number of prompts, making fatigue worse. Option A is wrong because SMS codes are weaker than app approvals and do nothing about prompt bombing.
Exam objective: AZ-305 Domain 1: Design authentication and authorization solutions
Q6.A manufacturer wants suppliers to access a SharePoint site and a custom Azure web application. Suppliers have their own corporate identities with various identity providers, and the manufacturer does not want to manage supplier passwords. Which solution should the architect recommend?
Explanation: Entra B2B collaboration lets guests authenticate with their own identity provider while the manufacturer manages only their access — no supplier passwords to manage. Option A is wrong because it creates exactly the password-management burden the requirement rules out. Option B is wrong because External ID is designed for large-scale consumer-facing apps, not for inviting a known set of business partners to internal resources. Option C is wrong because building federation with every supplier is enormously complex for a problem B2B solves natively.
Exam objective: AZ-305 Domain 1: Design authentication and authorization solutions
Q7.A company runs GitHub Actions workflows that deploy infrastructure to Azure. The security team has banned storing Azure service principal secrets in GitHub. How should the workflows authenticate to Azure?
Explanation: Workload identity federation lets GitHub Actions present its OIDC token to Entra ID and receive an access token in return — no Azure secret is stored anywhere, which satisfies the ban. Option B is wrong because the secret is still stored in GitHub, just in a different place. Option A is wrong because managed identities exist only for Azure resources, not for external GitHub-hosted runners. Option C is wrong because password hash synchronisation is a hybrid identity mechanism for Active Directory, not a workload authentication method.
Exam objective: AZ-305 Domain 1: Design authentication and authorization solutions
Q8.An architect is designing sign-in for a new consumer mobile app that will have two million users. Users should be able to register with an email address or a social account, and the company wants a branded sign-up experience. Which identity solution should be recommended?
Explanation: Entra External ID (the successor to Azure AD B2C) is built for consumer-facing apps at scale: self-service sign-up, local and social identity providers, and customisable branded user flows. Option B is wrong because B2B collaboration is for inviting known business partners to internal resources, not millions of consumers. Option A is wrong and dangerous — exposing a domain controller to the internet is a serious security failure. Option C is wrong because shared accounts destroy accountability and cannot support two million individual users.
Exam objective: AZ-305 Domain 1: Design authentication and authorization solutions
Q9.A global company wants all users to be prompted for MFA, except when signing in from the corporate office network, and wants access to the finance application to additionally require a managed, compliant device. What is the best way to implement this?
Explanation: Two Conditional Access policies implement the requirements exactly: the first enforces MFA everywhere except the trusted office location, and the second adds the compliant-device requirement scoped to the finance app. Option D is wrong because requiring a compliant device for all apps is stricter than required and would block unmanaged personal devices from ordinary apps. Option B is wrong because risk policies only act on risky sign-ins, not on every sign-in. Option A is wrong because per-user MFA cannot express location or device conditions and conflicts with Conditional Access enforcement.
Exam objective: AZ-305 Domain 1: Design authentication and authorization solutions