Authorisation, RBAC and Secrets Design

AZ-305 AZ-305 · Design identity, governance, and monitoring solutions

By Abu Anns · Last updated 20 November 2026Exam version: AZ-305 (skills measured as of 17 April 2026)

Authentication answers "who are you?"; authorisation answers "what are you allowed to do?" In Azure, authorisation has two layers that the exam constantly tests together: Microsoft Entra ID controls who can sign in, and Azure RBAC controls what a signed-in identity can do to Azure resources. Designing these layers well — with least privilege, just-in-time elevation, and secrets that no human ever sees — is a core AZ-305 skill.

Azure RBAC: roles, scopes, and inheritance

Azure RBAC assigns a role definition (a set of permissions) to a security principal (user, group, service principal, or managed identity) at a particular scope — management group, subscription, resource group, or individual resource. Permissions inherit downwards: a role assigned at subscription scope applies to every resource group and resource beneath it. The built-in roles cover most needs: Owner grants full management access including the ability to assign roles; Contributor grants full management access except role assignment; Reader grants read-only access. Then there are hundreds of specialised roles, such as Virtual Machine Contributor or Storage Blob Data Reader. A critical distinction the exam loves: control-plane roles (like Contributor) manage the resource itself, while data-plane roles (like Storage Blob Data Contributor) govern the data inside it. A Contributor on a storage account cannot read its blobs without a data-plane role. Assign roles to groups, not individual users, so access follows job changes automatically; assign at the highest scope that is still least privilege — usually the resource group — and let inheritance do the work.

Custom roles and attribute-based access control

When no built-in role fits, define a custom role with exactly the permissions needed — but custom roles are a maintenance burden, so the exam prefers a built-in role whenever one is close enough. Azure attribute-based access control (ABAC) extends RBAC with conditions based on attributes: for example, allow a user to read blobs only when the blob has a specific tag, or only when the request comes from a specific project tag. ABAC conditions are evaluated for data-plane operations on Storage, and they let you express rules ("contractors can read only blobs tagged with their project") that role assignment alone cannot. Deny assignments block specific actions even when a role would allow them; they are created by Azure (for example, to protect resources managed by Azure Blueprints or managed applications) and cannot be created directly by customers — so if a scenario needs to prevent an action, the answer is usually "do not grant the role" or an Azure Policy deny effect, not a deny assignment.

Privileged Identity Management: just-in-time privilege

Standing privileged access is a standing risk. Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) converts privileged roles into eligible assignments: a user activates the role only when needed, for a limited time, optionally after MFA, a justification, and approval. Design points: make Owner and User Access Administrator assignments eligible rather than active; require approval for activation of the most sensitive roles; set short maximum activation durations; and use PIM's access reviews to regularly confirm that eligible assignments are still needed. PIM covers both Entra ID roles (like Global Administrator) and Azure resource roles. In exam scenarios, whenever you see "administrators should have elevated access only when performing maintenance" or "standing admin access must be minimised", PIM is the answer — often combined with Conditional Access requiring MFA at activation.

Secrets, keys, and certificates: Azure Key Vault

Applications need secrets, keys, and certificates; humans should never handle them directly. Azure Key Vault is the central store, with two access planes: the management plane (creating and managing the vault, governed by RBAC) and the data plane (reading secrets, keys, and certificates, governed by either Key Vault access policies or Azure RBAC — Microsoft now recommends RBAC for new vaults). Choose Standard tier for software-protected keys and Premium tier when keys must be protected by FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validated HSMs; for dedicated single-tenant HSMs with full administrative control, use Managed HSM (FIPS 140-2 Level 3). Enable soft delete and purge protection so a deleted vault or secret can be recovered and cannot be permanently destroyed during the retention period — the exam treats these as must-haves for production vaults. For network security, use private endpoints so vault traffic never crosses the public internet, and enable the firewall to restrict access to selected networks. Certificates can be auto-rotated with integrated certificate authorities; secrets rotation should be automated where the consuming service supports it, and applications should reference secrets by URI with a managed identity rather than embedding them.

Authorising access to on-premises resources

Hybrid scenarios often need cloud users to reach on-premises applications. Microsoft Entra application proxy publishes internal web applications through Entra ID without opening inbound firewall ports: a lightweight connector inside the network makes outbound connections to Azure, and users authenticate with Entra ID (including MFA and Conditional Access) before reaching the app. It is the standard answer for "publish an on-premises intranet app to remote users securely". For legacy applications that need Kerberos, application proxy supports Kerberos constrained delegation. For resources that need domain-join semantics in the cloud, Microsoft Entra Domain Services provides a managed domain (domain join, group policy, LDAP, Kerberos) without deploying domain controllers — useful for lift-and-shift workloads that require AD DS features.

Zero Trust authorisation principles

Microsoft's Zero Trust model rests on three principles that AZ-305 expects you to apply: verify explicitly, use least privilege access, and assume breach. In practice this means every access decision is evaluated with all available signals (identity, device, location, risk), permissions are scoped as narrowly as possible, and the design assumes an attacker will eventually get inside — so lateral movement is limited by segmentation and just-in-time access. For applications, Zero Trust means managed identities everywhere, Key Vault for all secrets, private endpoints for data services, and no standing credentials. For administrators, it means PIM, Conditional Access, and privileged access workstations. When an exam scenario mentions Zero Trust, look for the answer that removes implicit trust: the design that verifies each request, grants the minimum, and contains the blast radius of a compromise. A related design point is access reviews for role assignments: even correctly assigned roles drift over time as people change jobs, so periodic attestation that access is still needed is part of a complete authorisation design, not an optional extra.

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Exam traps to watch for

Practice questions

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Q1.A developer has been assigned the Contributor role on a storage account but reports she cannot read the blobs inside it. The architect must fix this with least privilege. What should be recommended?

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Q2.A company requires that administrators have no standing privileged access: elevated roles must be activated only when needed, for at most four hours, with MFA and a written justification. Which solution meets this requirement?

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Q3.A financial services company must store encryption keys in hardware validated to FIPS 140-2 Level 3, with the company retaining full administrative control over the HSMs in a single-tenant environment. Which Azure service should the architect recommend?

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Q4.An application running on Azure Kubernetes Service needs database credentials. The security team requires that credentials rotate automatically and that no developer can read the production credentials. What should the architect recommend?

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Q5.A company wants contractors to read blobs in a storage account only when the blobs are tagged with the contractor's project code. The same storage account holds blobs for many projects. Which approach implements this with least privilege?

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Q6.A company needs remote employees to access an internal HR web application hosted on-premises. The security team will not open any inbound firewall ports, and access must require MFA. Which solution should the architect recommend?

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Q7.A production Key Vault holds certificates for a customer-facing application. The operations team is concerned that an accidental or malicious deletion could destroy the vault permanently. Which two settings should the architect require?

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Q8.An architect must grant a finance team read access to all resources in the production subscription, and a separate audit team read access to only one resource group. What is the simplest least-privilege design?

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Q9.A legacy application being migrated to Azure requires domain join, Group Policy, and LDAP authentication, but the company does not want to deploy or manage domain controllers in Azure. Which service should the architect recommend?

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